Goodness as "something we ought to do or strive for"?

A topic of debate in metaethics is whether or not we can reduce the notion of goodness into some natural property. 

We can say that goodness is something we ought to strive for. But why ought we strive for such a thing? Because it is good? This begs the question -- what makes something good? And so on. 

The naturalistic moral realist would define goodness in terms of natural properties. The difficulty in this is escaping the Open Question Argument (OQA) and answering how goodness can possibly be reduced. However, the weakness of non-natural moral realism is in characterizing what goodness is in the first place without being circular. 

But what if we are simply redefining the same term over and over again, such that we are creating a tautology? For example, what if the good is equivalent to what we ought to strive for? 

It seems that they are ontologically equivalent, and might be used interchangeably. This, I believe, escapes the circularity of non-natural moral realism. and the difficulty of defining the good under such a theory. 

There does seem to be issues posed by this sort of view: 

(1) Defining goodness in this way still makes it a thin moral concept. It tells us nothing about what we actually should do. Goodness is only evaluative, it has no descriptive substance. So this view says a whole lot of nothing about what we actually should do. In these cases, we should turn towards normative theories of ethics for better understanding of goodness. 

(2) Reducing goodness as obligation seems to broad, as it encapsulates the whole of normative evaluations. For example, take aesthetic obligation -- the idea that more beautiful things are better. Given two equivalent possible worlds, with all things being equal except beauty, aesthetic obligation would have us select the more beautiful world as better. Is this a moral concept? Or another type of normative evaluation altogether? 

Thus, if goodness as judgment is an all-things-considered judgment, it seems to be too broad. After all, when we take goodness as a noun in and of itself, it seems to be referring to moral good. This is opposed to taking goodness as a adjective or modifier on something else: a good piece of art, or a good husband, or a good hammer. 

A possible objection is that aesthetic judgments ultimately reduce to moral judgments. For example, the more beautiful object produces greater pleasure in us (utilitarianism) or better character (virtue ethics). For this theory, good art is by definition moral art. 

Perhaps this theory is too constrictive of what is good art. After all, good art may consist of a number of things: whether or not it accurately matches up to reality, whether or not it elicits an emotional response, whether or not it merely communicates the message of the artist, or whether or not it accurate uses artistic techniques such as symmetry. 

In a lot of these cases, good art does not produce moral results. Perhaps goodness of art is an excellence of the craft rather than excellence of moral conduct. Then aesthetic judgments cannot be reducible to moral judgments. 

Can aesthetic judgments be reduced to other things? Like judgments produced by evolution to better aid our survival? If aesthetic judgment can be reduced to facts about the world, then I do not believe that it is correct for them to be taken as normative statements -- it is very difficult to derive an is from an ought.