Michael Pace's "The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James’ ‘Will To Believe’ " - A Brief Summary

 Pace begins by answering a common atheist objection to moral-pragmatic justifications for theism, which are accused of amounting to mere wishful thinking. He begins with the Clifford's Principle of Evidentialism: That "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence." Is there any way in which we can vindicate moral-pragmatic arguments then? He concedes that it is epistemically wrong to engage in moral-pragmatic reasoning as we can't be morally correct without some epistemic "dirt". So we will need to argue without intellectual dishonesty.

Pace outlines the epistemically relevant questions for properly justified belief: How much evidence, and to what degree does this evidence support the conclusion? There are three cases in which evidence is insufficient: No evidence (or no relevant evidence), evidence, on balance, is insufficient even if any individual piece of evidence is compelling, and intuitively compelling cases in which evidence is insufficient. He admits that evidence required differs from person to person. Well, how high should the standards of epistemic belief be? 

Here is where William James' A Will to Believe comes in. In "J-cases", in which a decision is forced, momentous, and live, the epistemic agent must believe or not believe based in part on pragmatic considerations. Pace argues that James' argument fails to consider cases in which evidence does not favor a proposition, that make it more likely than not, in which cases, withholding belief is the epistemically sound choice. However, Pace tackles an important point not addressed by either James or Clifford: we need a principled account for how to determine when evidence is sufficient or insufficient.

Pragmatic encroachment is the idea that one is epistemically justified in believing a proposition only if one is pragmatically justified in acting as if p is true. Modern theories explain that the practical cost of error can raise evidential standards for justification. Moral encroachment uses moral reasons instead of purely pragmatic reasons. Results will require not just a subject's evidential standards fit their own preferences, but what preferences morally should be. 

(This is not an example from Pace but from Liz Jackson) Suppose you are at a social club and you know that 90% of the club's members are white and 9/10 of the club's wait staff are black. You see John Hope Franklin, a very well dress black man, and you assume he is a waiter. In such a case, the moral stakes for the assumption are high, but the evidence is also high. Thus, the moral consideration favors caution over courage. 

However, is there any way to courage to favor caution? Pace says yes. If the boons of being correct are comparatively much better than the bad moral consequences of not being correct, the counsel of courage should hold true. Examples that James gives is friendship, being in a social group, and thinking charitably of others.