Proposal: Pragmatic Arguments for Theism: Prudential and Moral Reasons

 My main question: How do pragmatic arguments for theism hold up to the traditional arguments from natural theology? 

Pragmatic arguments rely on the practical benefits of belief in God. 

1. Prudential reasons are reasons that somehow appeal to your desires. (Pascal's Wager) 

2. Moral reasons are reasons that appeal to the morally desirable ends of belief in God. (The Will to Believe)

They seem to have one advantage to traditional arguments such as contingency/cosmological arguments, theological arguments, etc. Whereas in traditional natural theology, these arguments conclude one matter: 

Traditional Conclusion (TC): Belief in God is justified. 

Pragmatic arguments further this one step: 

Pragmatic Conclusion 1 (PC1): Belief in God is justified. 

Pragmatic Conclusion 2: (PC2): You ought to hold this God as the highest good or worship him or etc. 

However, both stripes of pragmatic arguments fail to a moral objection that a religious believer might be convinced of, on a more fundamental level: Kant's Principle of Humanity. 

It states that: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end. Thus, PC2 fails because it fails because of what I write below: 

The most famous moral objection to Pascal's Wager comes from William James, who describes Pascal as attempting to strong-arm the unbeliever into belief as a “last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving heart” (1896). The believer who wagers has no genuine faith but is merely a follower of his own subjective desires. Using such a belief as a means to an end would neither flatter God nor attract whatever favors one desires from him. But there is a much more genuine issue with those who wager with God. 

To begin, we must distinguish between direct and indirect duties. If we have direct duties towards someone, we treat them as an end in and of itself. If we have indirect duties towards someone, we treat them as a means to another end, where that end is the object we have direct duties owed to. 

Thus, direct and indirect duties can be reduced to the form: 

Direct Duty: A moral agent A’s harming B is wrong solely because A has a moral obligation towards B. 

Indirect Duty: A moral agent A’s harming B is wrong solely because A’s harming B affects C, where C is not identical to B. 

The moment the wagerer considers the stakes, he is acting as a psychological egoist. He has no direct duties to anyone other than himself. If he chooses to believe, his belief is a mere means to an end, and Pascal’s Wager duties towards his creator are indirect — never direct, because he believes for the sake of his prudential interests.

It is no mistake that Kant identifies two things with dignity rather than a price: moral agents, and the moral law itself (Kant, 1993, as cited in Linville, 2009). Genuine respect for persons requires genuine respect for the moral law. In the case of theistic arguments, God fulfills both: he is both the prime moral agent and the personified moral law. It is immoral to treat God as if he has a price, as a disposable means to an end, where that end is eternal life, pleasure, material wealth, longevity, or the like.

If God exists, then we ought to treat our Creator as an end rather than a means, with direct, categorical duties rather than indirect, hypothetical duties, in the same way, we treat other persons. Just as how it is prima facie direct duty to treat my colleagues as means in and of themselves, rather than as a stepping stone in my own career, regardless of the possible goods that may be procured in acting in accordance with my own psychological egoism, we ought not to treat God as such. Harry Emerson Fosdick correctly recognizes this, noting that “God is not a cosmic bellboy for whom we can press a button to get things done” (1975).

One possible line of objection might be that Pascal’s Wager is simply a way to justify belief in God on practical grounds, and is only concerned with belief. However, in imagining God and the rewards that he grants, one must also attribute to him the qualities that he is defined by: his moral authority, his personhood, and the direct duties to him that moral agents are obligated and bound by. If we are to treat him as real, then we must also treat the responsibilities that are owed to him as real. 

Then, how should we evaluate where these two classes of arguments in the context of the rest of the field of philosophy of religion? 

Neither should ever form the basis of belief in God; to do so would be shooting oneself in the foot. I would never present my beliefs in that manner. I find it abominable to seriously adopt prudential reasons, just like we might dismiss the ethical egoist. Moral reasons might be more compelling. However, just as a deontologist criticizes the utilitarian for holding social good as the principle by which all agents should act by, we may do the same -- the ends are desirable, but do not trump the goodness found in seeking God out in the right manner.

Conclusion of paper: Finishing statement on moral psychology and anti-Humeanism with regards to moral motivation. Knowing what is good might not be enough to motivate doing the good. Such arguments might help compel one to do good. Prudential reasons and moral reasons might motivate one to seek out God or to adopt belief and carry out the good actions --  feed the hungry, cloth the naked, comfort the sick. 

- Some notes: I don't get into Doxastic Voluntarism/Involuntarism so I don't know if there is anything to be said there 

The only possible argument   

High noon