4/13 -- Applying James' Pragmatism to the Problem of Other Minds and Cartesian Skepticism

 William James, in The Will to Believe, thinks that if the truth of a proposition cannot be decided by epistemic means alone, then we should decide based on our passions. 

What do we mean by a proposition that cannot be decided by epistemic means alone? Consider the possibility that I am a brain in a vat. Epistemically, I cannot prove or disprove the case, and no evidence can be found such that epistemic needle moves in either direction (of believing that I am a real person, or that I am a brain in a vat). 

But pragmatically, I might come to some conclusions about the possibility that I am a brain in a vat -- namely, the conclusion that I am not a brain in a vat. I don't act in a way such that others don't exist, or that the external world is just simulated. In fact, I have real goals that I pursue, which mimic what would happen if I were to live in the real world, rather than one that is simulated. 

Can pragmatic considerations alter epistemic commitments? The evidence demands that I withhold judgment. But consider why pragmatic factors might influence my decision. 

The pragmatic theory of truth holds that whatever is practical is true. As such, because something works, it is true. But what if this was the wrong way to go about thinking about practical solutions? Are things true because they work? Or do they work if they are true? As such, there are two ways to think about how pragmatic considerations might factor into one's epistemic commitments. 

As such, there is no good reason to believe that we are actually a brain in a vat. The skeptic may point to the fact that the evidence points to neither side as having better real evidence. Or rather, no evidence is good evidence for actually coming to a conclusion about this matter. But if we factor in what practical consequences there might be, either pragmatic truths work because they are in fact true, or they are true because they are pragmatic. And both have the possibility of being true. If it is the former, then we have good evidence not to believe we are a brain in a vat. As such, mathematically, it is epistemically more sound to deny the skeptical thesis.