Goodness as "something we ought to do or strive for"?
A topic of debate in metaethics is whether or not we can reduce the notion of goodness into some natural property. We can say that goodness is something we ought to strive for. But why ought we strive for such a thing? Because it is good? This begs the question -- what makes something good? And so on. The naturalistic moral realist would define goodness in terms of natural properties. The difficulty in this is escaping the Open Question Argument (OQA) and answering how goodness can possibly be reduced. However, the weakness of non-natural moral realism is in characterizing what goodness is in the first place without being circular. But what if we are simply redefining the same term over and over again, such that we are creating a tautology? For example, what if the good is equivalent to what we ought to strive for? It seems that they are ontologically equivalent, and might be used interchangeably. This, I believe, escapes the circularity of non-natural moral real...