Against Divine Command Theory

DCT holds that the moral law is whatever God commands. I think that this theory is problematic. 

No Categorical Duties

At some point, all explanations must come to an end. Just like the child who keeps on asking why, we must look for the final, most ultimate explanation that can adequately account for knowledge. For example, mathematics is built on a set of unprovable axioms. Axioms must be assumed in order to avoid vicious circularity. 

In the moral realm, explanations must also come to an end. The divine command theorist will say that all moral duties are explained by God. The adaptationist will say that all moral duties are explained by evolution. And the egoist will explain moral duties in terms of pleasure and pain. All of these theories fail to adequately account for categorical duties -- or duties that have no further explanation. They are merely hypothetical duties, or duties in virtue of something else. Categorical duties are best illustrated by love: genuine, ideal love for someone else cannot be reduced to mere biological impulse, or transactional compromise. It must be love for love's sake. Similarly, goodness must be done for goodness's sake. This is what makes moral duty a categorical imperative, rather than a hypothetical one. 

If DCT is true, then goodness can never be done for goodness's sake. Rather, we are doing goodness to obey God's commands. Now, there can be categorical duties to obey God's commands (in virtue of his status as a benefactor to us, similar to how parents, teachers, and our leaders demand our respect and obedience). But suppose all moral duties -- including the duty to obey -- are mere hypothetical imperatives (that is, we do good things because God commands them, rather than because they are good things in and of themselves). In that case, it is impossible for us to love, for love is only a command of God, rather than something whose ultimate explanation is love's sake.